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INVESTORS' CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
MURRAY L. SIMPSON
ONGRESS, through legislation between 1933 and 1940, and the
courts, through liberal interpretation thereof, have given the
investor a broader and more definitive approach to civil recov-
ery. With a few exceptions, the federal securities laws have created
substantial improvements, both in substance and procedure, over the
common law remedies available to an investor in the fraudulent pur-
chase or sale of a security.
The Securities Act of 19331 (hereinafter referred to as Securities
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (hereinafter referred
to as Exchange Act) provide the basic liabilities upon which an in-
vestor may formulate his cause of action. The remedies created under
the other four federal securities acts3 are based in substance upon those
created by the Securities Act and Exchange Act, and except by cross
reference will not be discussed in this article.
The underlying difference between the federal statutory remedies
and those available at common law is the general shifting of the burden
of proof to the defendants. The reason is that the facts necessary to
establish the proof needed by the plaintiff in his common law action,
such as the action of deceit, are so often peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the defendant that the plaintiff has great difficulty in proving
his case.
1 1, 48 Star. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. S 77a (1958).
2 1, 48 Star. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1958).
3 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79
(1958); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1958);
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Star. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-1 (1958);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-i (1958).
MR. SIMPSON is an attorney with the United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Chicago Regional Office. He is a member of the Illinois Bar and attended the
University of Illinois and De Paul University College of Law. He is a member of the
Illinois State Bar Association Section on Corporation and Securities Law and the Ameri-
can Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law.
NoTE.-The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims re-
sponsibility for any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commis-
sion or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
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The author intends to discuss the expressed and implied remedies
available to the injured investor under the Securities Act and Exchange
Act, the significant advantages, if any, over the companion common
law remedies, and some of the problems he may be faced with in
establishing his case. In discussing the remedies an investor may have,
the author assumes that the facts necessary to prove the substantive
allegations exist, and does not intend to present the problems of evi-
dence that the plaintiff may incur.
CIVIL LIABILITIES ON ACCOUNT OF FALSE
REGISTRATION STATEMENT
Any purchaser acquiring a security which is offered under an effec-
tive registration statement has a variety of persons to sue if "any part
of the registration statement, when such part became effective, con-
tained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading. . . ." As in common law, the ques-
tion of truth or omission must relate to a material fact rather than an
opinion, and the accuracy or completeness of the registration state-
ment is only considered as of its effective date.
In one of the first law review articles following the passage of the
Securities Act, Professor Harry Shulman effectively summarized the
Act and Section 11:
It requires a picture not simply of the show window, but of the entire store.
It requires not simply truth in the statements volunteered, but disclosure. And,
for false statement, it provides civil liability.5
Liability under Section 11 is created with two great departures from
the elements of the common law actions of rescission and deceit. The
first is that the plaintiff can sue under this section without having to
prove that the misrepresentation was addressed or intended to influence
him. The cause of action runs in favor of all innocent buyers, thus
eliminating the requirement of "privity" of the parties.
The other departure from the two common law actions is the
absence of any requirement of proof that the plaintiff "relied" on the
registration statement. However, if the plaintiff acquired the security
after the issuer has made generally available to its security holders an
earning statement covering a period of at least twelve months begin-
4 Securities Act of 1933, S 11 (a), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (a) (1958).
5 Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L.J. 227, 242 (1933).
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ning after the effective date of the registration statement, recovery is
conditioned on proof that the plaintiff relied upon the untrue state-
ment in the registration statement when acquiring the security. But
during this first year following the effective date of the registration
statement, the investor need only establish the existence of the material
untruth or omission and is relieved of the burden of proving reliance
or of showing that the untruth or omission was the cause of the loss
suffered.
As in common law rescission, there is no element of scienter in the
plaintiff's cause of action under Secticn 11. Liability is imposed be-
cause of the existence of an untrue statement or the omission of a
material fact required to be stated regardless of the intentions or good
faith of the defendants. To exempt from civil liability a person who in
good faith makes a misstatement would be contrary to the purpose of
the entire Act as well, as it is practically impossible to deny a "claim"
of good faith.6 The House Committee Report stated:
Their essential characteristic consists of a requirement that all those responsi-
ble for statements upon the face of which the public is solicited to invest its
money shall be held to standards like those imposed by law on a fiduciary.7
The absence of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant
places liability on a great number of persons, namely, the issuer, its
directors, the underwriters, the experts having prepared certain parts
of the registration statement, etc." In addition, the plaintiff can reach
any person he can show to be in a control relationship with any of the
persons liable under Section 11.1
The liability of the issuer under Section 11 is virtually absolute, its
only affirmative defense being that of proving the plaintiff knew of the
untruth or omission alleged in the complaint at the time the security
was acquired. The issuer may not assert as a defense that it had made a
reasonable investigation or that it had acted in good faith. Section 11
does, however, provide certain affirmative defenses to all persons,
other than the issuer, liable on account of the false registration state-
ment. These defenses are specifically set out in Section 11 (b), its effect
6 Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 875, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1933).
7 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1933).
8 Section l1(a) specifically lists every person liable under that section. 48 Stat. 82
(1933), 15 U.S.C. S 77k(a) (1958).
9 Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1958). See the text
at note 40, infra.
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being to impose liability on the directors, officers, experts and under-
writers based upon standards of negligence rather than of fraud. The
standard of reasonableness required in these defenses is "that required
of a prudent man in the management of his own property." 10
The House Committee, in providing these defenses, justified the
placing of the burden of proof upon the defendants:
Every lawyer knows that with all the facts in the control of the defendant,
it is practically impossible for a buyer to prove a state of knowledge or a failure
to exercise due care on the part of defendant. Unless responsibility is to involve
merely paper liability, it is necessary to throw the burden of disproving re-
sponsibility for reprehensible acts of omission or commission on those who pur-
port to issue statements for the public's reliance .... 11
This explains the Act's departure from the underlying obstacle faced
by the plaintiff in a common law action, i.e., the necessity of proving
facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.
Section 11(b) (3) (C) provides an affirmative defense to a person
other than the expert himself, regarding any part of the registration
statement purporting to have been made on the authority of an expert,
where the burden of proof is sustained that "he had no reasonable
ground to believe and did not believe ... that the statements therein
were untrue ... or that such part of the registration statement did not
fairly represent the statement of the expert." This defense clearly miti-
gates the burden of due care when reliance is placed upon experts in
the use of material in the registration statement prepared by experts.
The Securities and Exchange Commission will not permit central data
in the registration statement such as description of business, under-
writing arrangements, description of property, promotional history,
etc. to be stated on the authority of an expert. Information may only
be "expertized" insofar as it is of a type requiring the expert skill,
knowledge or opinion with respect to which the expert is qualified to
testify, and any portion of the registration statement prepared or certi-
fied by an expert must be plainly identified. In a proceeding to deter-
mine the suspension of a security from registration, the Commission
held that management cannot avoid responsibility by relying blindly
on the expert's work, even if properly employed. 12 The facts neces-
sary for the issuance of an order in this case are not the same, however,
as those necessary to prove civil liability.
10 Securities Act of 1933, S 11 (c), 48 Stat. 83 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77k (c) (1958).
11 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1933).
12 See Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706 (1939).
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The only remedy available under Section 11 is to sue for damages.
An action for rescission against anyone but the immediate seller would
not restore the parties to the status existing before the sale, and would
place a disproportionate and unnecessary burden upon such persons as
the directors, officers and experts. Damages are purely compensatory
and not penal, notwithstanding the action created by the Act is based
on fraud.1
3
The amount of recovery is measured by the difference between the
amount paid for the security and either (1) the value of the security
as of the time suit was brought, or (2) the price at which the security
was disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which the
security was disposed of after suit but before judgment, if such dam-
ages shall be less than the difference between the amount paid and the
value as of the time the suit was brought. Therefore, if the market
goes up before judgment, the defendant gets the benefit if the stock is
sold, but if the market falls, the plaintiff still cannot get more than the
difference between the purchase price and the value at the time the
suit was filed. And in any case, the amount recoverable may not ex-
ceed the price at which the security was offered to the public, adverse-
ly affecting the purchaser who acquired the security in the open
market at a price higher than its original offering.
In an action under Section 11, the defendant, including the issuer,
may reduce the damages recoverable to the extent he proves the
depreciation in value of the security involved did not result from the
untrue statement or omission to state a material fact in the registration
statement. This is a form of causation as a partial defense rather than
an element of the cause of action.
The liability of the underwriter is also limited to the total price at
which the securities directly or indirectly underwritten by him and
distributed were offered to the public. But if an underwriter receives
some benefit from the issuer which the other underwriters do not
share in proportion to their respective interests, he may be liable for
the entire issue.
Section 11 provides that the court may, in its discretion, require an
undertaking for the payment of costs, including reasonable attorney's
fees. This has the effect of deterring the filing of many complaints (or
defenses).
It should be noted at this point that since the gist of the cause of
13Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Calif. 1939).
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action under Section 11 is a false effective registration statement, defi-
ciencies in a preliminary prospectus ("red herring") or an expanded
"tombstone ad" do not create Section 11 liability. A preliminary pros-
pectus is not part of an effective registration statement, and the "tomb-
stone ad" is not part of a registration statement at all.
One of the few places where the statutory remedy under Section 11
severely limits its advantage over the common law actions is the re-
strictive, double-barreled statute of limitations.' 4 No action may be
brought to enforce any liability created by Section 11 unless it is
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or
omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, and in no event may it be brought more
than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public.
The federal courts consistently follow under the Securities Act the
general rule that, when the same statute which creates a cause of action
also contains a limitation period, the statute of limitations not only bars
the remedy but also destroys the liability. The plaintiff must therefore
plead and prove facts showing that he is within the statute of limita-
tions.15
CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH
PROSPECTUSES AND COMMUNICATIONS
Section 12 of the Securities Act creates two distinct liabilities and
will be discussed separately, while the similarities and common prob-
lems will be discussed together. Section 12 (1) creates a liability upon
any person who "offers or sells a security in violation of Section 5"u
(Registration of Securities), and Section 12(2) makes a person liable
for offering or selling a security "by the use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."'"
7
SECTION 12(1)
This section gives the purchaser of any security the right to sue the
seller for damages or rescission by proving that the security was sold
14 Securities Act of 1933, S 13, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.G. §77m (1958).
15 Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances v. Deckert, 123 F. 2d 979 (3rd Cir. 1941).
16 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1958).
1T48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. S 771(2) (1958).
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in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.'8 The only affirmative
defense then available is that the particular security or transaction was
exempt from the provisions of Section 5, and the burden of proving
this exemption is on the defendant.19 The defendant's intent or knowl-
edge of the violation is again irrelevant, and the fact that the purchaser
knew the security was not registered or that the prospectus failed to
meet the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act does not
affect his cause of action. There is no defense, as will be seen exists in
Section 12 (2), based on the purchaser's knowledge, and the courts are
generally reluctant to bar the plaintiff by his conduct except in very
clear cases.
20
Assuming the use of the mails or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce, Section 5 declares it unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, to sell, or deliver after sale, a
security unless a registration statement for such security is in effect; to
transmit a prospectus for a security with respect to which a registra-
tion statement has been filed where the prospectus fails to meet the
requirements of Section 10, or to transmit such security for sale or
delivery after sale without being accompanied or preceded by a Sec-
tion 10 prospectus; or to offer to sell or offer to buy any security
where a registration statement has not been filed as to such security, or
while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop
order.
Sections 3 and 4 of the Securities Act define the securities and the
transactions, respectively, which are exempt from the provisions of
Section 5. Space does not permit an analysis of these sections, but their
importance in determining whether a cause of action exists under Sec-
tion 12 (1) cannot be stressed enough. Due caution must be given to
the easy proof available under some of these exemptions, at least in
establishing a prima facie defense for the defendant.
One of the most serious problems faced by an issuer arises when an
exemption from the provisions of Section 5 is relied upon in good
faith during an intrastate offering (offer and sale only to residents of
the state where the issuer is incorporated and does business) or a pri-
vate placement (transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering), while the purchaser took the security with a view to distri-
18 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
1 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). See also SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.
2d 241 (2nd Cir. 1959).
20 See Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F. 2d 855 (2nd Cir. 1956).
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bution, thus defeating the issuer's exemption. This problem has become
more acute since the Cro'well-Collier opinion 21 dealt a severe blow to
the issuer's reliance on the "investment letter." In deciding what is
meant by "holding for investment," the Commission, in the Crowell-
Collier case, made clear the fact that time is not the controlling factor.
In determining the purchaser's intent as to whether he took "with a
view to distribution," a long lapse of time is still, however, the strongest
evidence.
Even though Section 12 (1) does not apply to the ordinary brokers'
transactions,2 2 a broker-dealer may become liable for violating Section
5 if he effects a distribution of securities from a person in a control
relationship with the issuer, thus becoming a statutory underwriter
and losing the exemption available under Section 4(1). Many similar
corollary problems exist in this area which cannot be made the subject
of this article.
An interesting situation was created by the 1954 amendment to
Section 1223 wherein the words "offer or" were inserted. A seller can
now make an illegal offer (assuming jurisdictional means used) fol-
lowed by a legal sale, i.e., he makes an offer in violation of Section
5(b) (1) or 5 (c), but the sale is made after the effective date of the
registration statement and a statutory prospectus accompanies the secu-
rity. Since Section 12 (1) (as well as 12 (2)) refers to any person who
"offers or sells," the seller may be liable to the purchaser even though
the actual sale was not in violation of Section 5. Furthermore, since Sec-
tion 12(1) makes no reference to delivery but refers to any person
who violates Section 5, there may be a legal offer and sale but a deliv-
ery after sale in violation of Section 5 (b) (2).24
SECTION 12 (2)
This section creates liability for the use of untrue statements or
omissions to state a material fact in connection with the offer or sale of
any security, whether or not registered. The only securities exempt
21 The Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825, August
12, 1957, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (2d ed.) 76, 539.
22 Securities Act of 1933, S 4 (2), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. S 77d (2) (1958).
23 The amendment is contained in § 9, 68 Stat. 686 (1954).
24 On transactions made within 40 days after the effective date of the registration
statement a dealer must deliver a statutory prospectus, and failure to do so will place
him in violation of Section 5, unless he is relying on the ordinary brokers' transaction
exemption under Section 4(2).
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from Section 12(2) are government, municipal and certain bank
securities set forth in Section 3 (a) (2).
Unlike Section 12 (1), the liability of the seller under this section is
not absolute. The seller has a defense if he can sustain the burden of
proof "that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission." This shifting of
the burden of proof again eliminates the element of scienter from the
plaintiff's cause of action since he does not have to prove, nor even
allege, that the person making the false statement knew it was false.
This defense limits an action under Section 12 (2) to intentional or
negligent misstatements or omissions, but the defendant often has a
difficult time sustaining the burden of proof that in the exercise of
reasonable care he could not have known of the falsity.
25
The plaintiff has another distinct advantage over the common law
actions in that he does not have to prove reliance, 26 but only that he
did not know of the untruth or omission. In Murphy v. Cady,27 the
court held that in addition to this allegation that the plaintiff did not
know the representations were false, the plaintiff must allege and prove
that he could not have ascertained their falsity by the exercise of
reasonable care.
In Dale v. Rosenfeld,28 the plaintiff in a Section 12(2) action
claimed that he believed the statement under the heading "Underwrit-
ing" meant that the underwriting was a firm commitment, though he
later learned at a stockholders' meeting that it was a "best efforts" deal.
The prospectus contained a statement that "A copy of the Under-
writing Agreement may be examined at the offices of the Under-
writer." In reversing the lower court, Judge Swan stated that the court
need not find that the prospectus contained untrue statements, but
that it is sufficient if the statements are misleading. In denying the
defendant's claim that the plaintiff could have ascertained the true
facts had he examined the underwriting agreement, the court held that
the "availability elsewhere of truthful information cannot excuse un-
truths or misleading omissions in the prospectus.
' 29
25 See Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (S.D. Maine 1939).
26 Newberg v. American Dryer Corp. 195 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa., 1961). The court
held that the plaintiff need not allege reliance on any misstatement, or any causal con-
nection between the alleged violation and damages claimed.
27 30 F. Supp. 466 (S.D. Me. 1939).
28 229 F. 2d 855 (2nd Cir. 1956).
2 9 Id. at 858.
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The element of reliance is related to the concept of materiality. As
in the common law actions, the plaintiff must prove the misstatement
or omission was of a material fact, and what differentiates an opinion
from a material fact varies in each case. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently handed down an opinion which held that the
defendant-salesman had failed to disclose material information which
he had a duty to do because of "his position of trust and confidence"
and his "superior knowledge. ' 3 0 The court acknowledged the fact that
an action for deceit cannot be founded upon the mere expression of an
opinion, but held that since an expression of an opinion, if honestly
made, is an expression of what the speaker believes to be a fact, the ex-
pression of a dishonest opinion to one entitled to rely upon it consti-
tutes deceit for which an action will lie.
Unlike Section 11, the dependence in Section 12 (2) on the use of
the mails or facilities of interstate commerce in the offer or sale of the
security gives rise to one of the exceptions to the advantages the
statutory remedy under the federal acts has over the common law
remedies. Under Section 11 the basis for federal regulation is the filing
and effectiveness of the offending registration statement with the
Commission, while Section 12(2) has a jurisdictional requirement
which often leaves the plaintiff with only the common law or state
statutory remedies.
The jurisdictional language under Section 12 (2) is less comprehen-
sive than that of Section 17 (a), the general anti-fraud provision of the
Securities Act upon which governmental civil enforcement and crimi-
nal proceedings are based. The problem which has arisen under Sec-
tion 12 (2) is whether the misrepresentation itself must be transmitted
through the mails or the facilities of interstate commerce.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Kemper v.
Lohnes,81 a Section 12 (2) action, held that the untrue statement is the
"gravamen of the offense" and must be made by the use of the mails or
by any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce. The court affirmed the granting of the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that
the alleged misrepresentations were not transmitted by use of the mails,
30 Anderson v. Knox, 297 F. 2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961). This decision is interesting for
the purpose of seeing the extent the court went to in considering the salesman's state-
ments as a material fact rather than an opinion.
31173 F. 2d 44 (7th Cir. 1949).
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and that the mails were used solely to advertise the security and arrange
a meeting between the parties.
The logic behind the Kemper opinion was seriously questioned by
the Eighth Circuit in 1960,32 when the court stated that this opinion
"seems to us an artificial interpretation and unwarranted curbing of the
operation of [Section 12 ], which manifestly is a remedial statute ....
The court agreed with two prior cases in the Second Circuit 34 and the
Fifth Circuit 35 that the word "sells" involves as an inherent element
the delivery of the security, and that the use of the mails to effect the
delivery of a security brings the situation within the remedial provi-
sions of Section 12 (2) as much as does a use which represents an inci-
dent of any other element of its sale.
While the Seventh Circuit has never reversed its holding in the
Kemper case, 6 its limited interpretation of Section 12 (2) appears to
be outweighed by the other circuits. The court in Blackwell v. Bent-
sen 37 adequately summarizes what appears to be the better and domi-
nant view today:
This is a remedial statute. It should be liberally construed to accomplish the
dominant legislative purpose in adopting it, which is to prevent the use of the
mails, and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce, in the perpetration of
investment frauds .... Here the sales were apparently by oral communication,
but the transactions were consummated by the use of the mails, which in our
opinion brings the transaction within the statute. Delivery of the deeds and con-
tracts is an integral part of the sale.
3 8
QUESTIONS COMMON TO SECTIONS 12 (1) AND 12 (2)
Section 12 provides that any prospective defendant "shall be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him," indicating that there
must be privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. The purchaser
can recover only from his immediate seller,3 9 while in a common law
32 MacClain v. Bules, 275 F. 2d 431 (8th Cir. 1960).
33 Id. at 434.
34 Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F. 2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943).
35 Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F. 2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953).
36 In 1951 the Seventh Circuit took a different view in a criminal mail fraud case by
stating that "the question is whether what was sent through the mail was part and parcel
of a scheme to defraud." United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F. 2d 96, 106 (7th Cir. 1951).
37 203 F. 2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953).
38 d. at 693. In Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F. 2d 76, 80 (8th Cir. 1959),
the court stated that it seemed unlikely that Congress intended that acts subject to crimi-
nal liability under Section 17(a) would not create civil liability under Section 12(2).
3
9 Winter v. D. J. & M. Investment & Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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deceit action there is no absolute requirement of privity. The pur-
chaser under Section 12 may, however, seek recovery from any per-
son who controls his immediate seller, subject to the specific defense
available to a controlling person.
Section 1540 (as amended), creating the liability of controlling per-
sons, states that such person "shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person. . . is liable, un-
less the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds
to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist.' 14 By placing liability on
controlling persons, the possibility of avoiding the intended conse-
quences of the Act through delegation to subsidiary companies, agents
or managers is reduced. What constitutes "control" is often a difficult
question of fact, especially where the person liable under Section 11 or
12 is not acting within the scope of his duty to his principal.
Because of the privity requirement, a purchaser in a firm-commit-
ment underwriting can recover only from the dealer who sold to him
(excluding the possible control situation), while in a best-efforts dis-
tribution where the broker may act as the issuer's agent and title passes
from the issuer directly to the ultimate purchaser, the latter can reach
the issuer under Section 12. In the firm-commitment situation where
the investor has to sue the dealer from whom he purchased, the dealer
can bring in the underwriter, and the underwriter can then bring in the
issuer under third party practice42 and settle the ultimate liability in
one action.
Since a broker for the issuer in a best-efforts distribution is a "per-
son who sells" within the meaning of Section 12, liability is imposed
not only on the issuer, but also on the brokers when selling securities
owned by other persons .4 This then raises the interesting question of
the issuer's liability when he has nothing to do with the broker's mis-
statement. It may depend entirely on the defense the issuer has avail-
able under 12 (2) if he can prove he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission.
In seeking rescission under Section 12 the plaintiff is entitled to re-
40 Section 15 creates a liability on persons who control any person proven liable under
Section II or 12.48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1958).
41A ithout the 1934 amendment inserting this defense (§ 208, 48 Stat. 908) the con-
trolling person was liable to the same extent as the person controlled with no defense
available.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
43 Cady v. Murphy, 113 F. 2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940).
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cover the consideration paid for the security with interest, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon tender of the security.
Since the Act does not specify how or when tender should be made, it
appears appropriate to condition tender upon full payment of judg-
ment recovered." When the plaintiff no longer owns the security he
may recover damages which are to be measured as to result in the sub-
stantial equivalent of rescission.
The statute of limitations for actions under Section 12 is similar to
the double-barreled limitations placed upon Section 11 actions. For lia-
bility under 12(1), an action must be brought within one year after
the violation of Section 5, and no more than three years after the
security was bona fide offered to the public. Under 12 (2), the action
must be brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue
statement or omission, or after such discovery should have been made
by the exercise of reasonable diligence (same as in Section 11), and no
more than three years after the sale. As in Section 11, one of the
greatest difficulties in applying the limitations period arises in the de-
termination of when an untrue statement or omission could have been
discovered "by the exercise of reasonable diligence." This undoubted-
ly is a question of fact to be decided in each case.
SUPPLEMENT TO SECURITIES ACT REMEDIES
Sellers may try to avoid the liability provisions of Sections 1 1 and 12
by obtaining stipulations from buyers to waive compliance by the
sellers with the requirements of the law. Section 14 of the Securities
Act therefore provides that:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of the rules and
regulations of the Commission shall be void.45
In addition, the courts have repeatedly held that a hedge clause or
legend disclaiming liability has little, if any, legal effect as protection
against civil liability where a person makes a representation which he
knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered, is
false or misleading.4"
44 Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F. 2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957).
45 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. S 77n (1958). Note that the word "compliance" is in
the language of the statute, while Section 12 has no penal provision.
46See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410 (1941); Tone v.
Halsey, Stuart & Co., 286 Ill. App. 169, 3 N.E. 2d 142 (1936); Continental Ins. Co. v.
Equitable Trust Co., 127 Misc. 45, 215 N.Y.S. 281 (1926).
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There is no express provision in Section 12 as there is in Section 11
for the undertaking of costs. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
provide that costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs,4 7 but these costs do not normally include
attorneys' fees as Section 11 specifically provides.
Another area not specifically provided for in the Securities Act is
the question of whether an action under Sections 11 or 12 is assignable
or survives the death of the plaintiff. There are relatively few cases on
this point but the trend is in favor of the assignability and survival of
these actions by applying a remedial rather than a penal approach to
the Act.
48
It is important to note that the remedies created by Sections 11 and
12 are "in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may
exist at law or in equity."49 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the United
States District Courts over Section 11 and 12 actions is concurrent
with the state courts,5" meaning that the plaintiff may choose either
forum to bring his action. Another advantage of these federal remedies
is the wide choice of venue available to the plaintiff and extraterritorial
service of process.51
REMEDIES CREATED BY EXCHANGE ACT
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains three specific provi-
sions on civil liability, Sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18. The liability
created under Section 16(b) for "short-swing" profits by insiders re-
quires an exhaustive analysis in itself and will not be discussed herein.
Also, the recovery under that section inures to the corporation and
not to an investor.
SECTION 9 (e)
Section 9 of the Exchange Act52 contains specific prohibitions
against the manipulation of prices of securities registered on a national
securities exchange. Subsection (e) provides that any person who will-
fully participates in any act or transaction which is in violation of that
4 7 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
48 See Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 253 U.S. 117 (1920); Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,
133 F. Supp. 753 (D. N.J. 1955).
49 Securities Act of 1933 § 16, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1958).
50 Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1958).
51 Ibid.
5248 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1958).
INVESTORS' CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL LAWS
section shall be "liable to any person who shall purchase or sell any
security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction...."'
The remedy to the investor under 9(e) ignores the common law
element of privity, but the causation requirement is even more severe
than the burden faced by the plaintiff in a common law deceit action.
Under the statutory remedy, the plaintiff must prove that he bought
or sold at a price that was "affected by" the manipulation, and taking
into consideration the factors affecting the rise and fall of stock prices,
it is often difficult for the plaintiff to sustain this burden.
Moreover, the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant "willfully"
participated in the manipulation, a requirement not found in any of the
other remedies created by the six federal securities acts. The courts
have applied various meanings to the term "willfully," with the most
liberal interpretations given by the Commission in broker-dealer revo-
cation cases. 54
Section 9(e) does provide a definite advantage over the Securities
Act's remedies in that there is no express reference to the plaintiff's
knowledge of the manipulation, while another requirement, of less
difficulty, is that the plaintiff must affirmatively allege and prove that
the security involved is registered on a national securities exchange. 5
In general, the maintenance of an action under this section is very
difficult, especially since the prohibitions of Section 9 are multiple and
the facts necessary to prove manipulation are not easily accessible to
the plaintiff. Many transactions, however, prohibited by Section 9(e)
regarding registered securities are also prohibited by the general anti-
fraud provisions and come within the language of these sections the
same as with an unregistered security. 56
The statute of limitations under 9(e) appears very definite by pro-
viding that the action must be brought within one year after the dis-
covery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years
after the violation as the maximum. "Reasonable diligence" has been
read into the interpretation of "discovery of the facts" by the Fifth
5348 Star. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1958).
54 See Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946); Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C.
1111 (1940); Foreman & Co., 3 S.E.C. 132 (1938); Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 5870, February 9, 1959. See also the Courts' views in criminal
cases, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S.
389 (1933).
55 Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
56 See Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941).
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Circuit, which held that discovery is to be determined by an objective
standard, and actual knowledge or notice of facts which, in the exer-




Section 18 of the Exchange Act5" creates a liability for making, or
causing to be made, any false or misleading statement of a material fact
in any application, report or document filed pursuant to any of the
provisions of the Act.
As in Section 9(e), the plaintiff is faced with the burden of proving
that the price of the security he purchased or sold "was affected" by the
false statement. In addition, the plaintiff must prove that he purchased
or sold the security "in reliance" upon such statement, and that he did
not know the statement was false or misleading. Assuming the plaintiff
manages to prove all this, the defendant may maintain that he acted in
good faith with no knowledge that such statement was false or mis-
leading.
The only advantage to the plaintiff over a common law remedy is
the absence of any requirement of privity. The statute of limitations is
identical with that under Section 9(e), which further restricts the
plaintiff in comparison to his possible common law action. But the
plaintiff is not limited to this statutory remedy and, as under 9 (e), can
usually seek relief under the more liberal remedies implied from the
anti-fraud provisions in Rule 10b-5.
IMPLIED REMEDIES UNDER THE EXCHANGE ACT
The dominant purpose of the securities acts has been the regulation
of the issuance of securities and transactions upon national securities
exchanges as well as in other phases of the organized securities market.
These acts have expressly provided for civil remedies in specific situa-
tions for the injured investor, and in addition, the courts have inferred
and created civil remedies in his favor based upon violation of the sub-
stantive provisions of the Acts, whether or not within an organized
securities market. The most comprehensive, and presumably the most
liberal, of these remedies is the one impliedly granted to a person de-
57 Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F. 2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1959).
5848 Star. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958).
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frauded in the purchase or sale of a security by one who is in violation
of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 thereunder. 59
Section 10(b) declares it unlawful to use or employ any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security in contravention of the rules pre-
scribed by the Commission. In 1942, the Commission promulgated
thereunder Rule 1Ob-5, derived from the substantive language of the
anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act (Section 17 (a)), providing
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The liability created by this Rule presents a less strict criterion of
fraud than that imposed at common law. The Rule appears to require
proof of some fraud or material misstatement, which may be half-
truths or even silence if a duty to speak exists. And unlike its counter-
part under the Securities Act, the unlawful activity applies in con-
nection with the purchase as well as the sale of any security.
The broader concept of the statutory prohibition over the common
law fraud was discussed in Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v. S.E.C.60
This case involved a review of a broker-dealer revocation order for
violation of Rule 15cl-2 under the Exchange Act. Since the definition
in that rule of what constitutes a manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance by a broker or dealer is identical with the language in
Rule lOb-5, the decision can be considered in connection with the
extent of Rule 10-5's prohibition. The court stated in the Hughes case
that:
We need not stop to decide, however, how far common-law fraud was shown.
... The essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do
not know market conditions from the overreachings of those who do.61
5948 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958); 16 Fed. Reg. 7928 (1951), amending
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
60 139 F. 2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
61 Id. at 437.
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Since neither the Act ( 10 (b)) nor Rule 1 Ob-5 thereunder expressly
created a civil remedy for violation thereof, a cause of action was
implied based on the theory that when a statute is violated and one
of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted is injured, a civil
remedy is imputed from the violation.6 2 The landmark case implying
a civil remedy for the violation of Rule lob-5 is Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co."- decided in 1946 by Judge William H. Kirkpatrick. The
Kardon doctrine has been followed by four different Courts of Ap-
peals64 and several district courts including the Northern District of
Illinois in a 1952 decision in Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres
Corp.65 In the Northern Trust case, Judge La Buy held that the
Exchange Act created a civil right of action in persons injured by
the violation of its provision against the use of manipulative or decep-
tive devices. In the Kardon decision, where the defendants argued
that there can be no implied remedy where Congress created express
remedies in certain sections and not in 10(b), the court stated:
Where, as here, the whole statute discloses a broad purpose to regulate securi-
ties transactions of all kinds and, as a part of such regulation, the specific section
in question provides for the elimination of all manipulative or deceptive methods
in such transactions, the construction contended for by the defendants may not
be adopted. In other words, in view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere
omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative
what the general law implies. 66
Another basis for implied liability, which was also considered in
the Kardon case, is the statutory enactment that a contract in violation
of the Act is void. This necessarily implies a civil remedy to relieve
the plaintiff of his obligations thereunder.
The advantages of the implied cause of action under Rule lOb-5
over the common law and other statutory remedies are numerous.
There is no requirement of proof of causation between the alleged
act and the damages suffered. Scienter is not an element of the plain-
tiff's case, particularly when his cause of action is based on the making
of an untrue statement or omission to state a material fact, rather than
62 See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
6369 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Penn. 1946).
64Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Beury v.
Beury, 222 F. 2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F. 2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Slavin v.
Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F. 2d 799 (3rd Cir. 1949).
65 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
66 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Penn. 1946).
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proof that the defendant employed a device, scheme or artifice to
defraud or his acts operated as a fraud or deceit upon the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the plaintiff is not faced with any express defenses or
substitute elements as exist in Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities
Act.
Regardless of any express reference to reliance, the courts have
assumed that no recovery can be granted without some proof of re-
liance. In Reed v. Riddle Airlines6 7 the court denied a seller's action
for rescission of a contract to sell 112,500 shares of stock because the
buyer had allegedly stated that there was no market for the stock.
Judge Rives held that the evidence supported the lower court's find-
ing that the plaintiff "did not rely" on the buyer's alleged statements.68
What about privity between the parties? Professor Louis Loss feels
that the plaintiff under a 10b-5 action should have at least the same
leeway regarding suit against participating agents, directors and offi-
cers as under Section 12 (2) of the Securities Act, which is consider-
ably more restrictive on its face. 69 Several cases have indicated some
favoritism towards his view, but no definite decision against the privity
requirement exists.7°
One of the advantages in a 10b-5 action over the express remedies
is the absence of the restrictive, double-barreled statute of limitations.
Since there is none provided in the Act and there is no general federal
statute of limitations for civil actions, the general fraud statute of
limitations of the forum state must be applied.7' Thus, even though a
plaintiff's cause of action under an express remedy (Section 12 of
Securities Act) is barred by the short statute of limitations in Section
13 of the Securities Act, he may still be able to bring his action under
Rule lob-5 in a state that has a longer limitations period.72 This also
creates the problem of "forum shopping" since the Act provides na-
67 266 F. 2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959).
68 See Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), regarding the plaintiff-
seller's reliance on the defendant's duty to speak.
69 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1769 (1961).
70 See Donovan v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Joseph v. Farnsworth
Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
71 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Here the court
allowed the 10b-5 action where the longer state statute of limitations kept the action
alive.
72 See Phillip v. J. H. Lederer Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 91,039 (S.D.N.Y. June
27, 1961), where the New York 6 year statute was applied.
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tionwide service of process with the right to bring the action in any
district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation oc-
curred, or in any district wherein the defendant is found, lives or
transacts business.73 Another problem, just worth mentioning, is the
conflict that may arise between the state and federal laws regarding
the tolling of statutes of limitations, and reference should be made to
the applicable statutes if the facts warrant it. The United States Dis-
trict Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all actions based on vio-
lation of the Exchange Act or rules thereunder, contrary to the
Securities Act where the action may be brought in a state court or
the district court.
74
Another important facet of the 10b-5 remedy, and probably one of
its most significant advantages, is the right of a buyer to sue there-
under and avoid the restrictions imposed by the Securities Act.
Whether the buyer has a right to sue under this remedy has often been
argued on the basis that he is given specific remedies under the Securi-
ties Act, but the seller, aside from Sections 9(e) and 18 of the Ex-
change Act can only recover because the Commission promulgated
Rule 10b-5 and the courts implied a remedy under it. The theory
behind this view is that to allow buyers to sue under 10b-5 would be
to ignore the safeguards cast around their remedies by express Con-
gressional action.
The opposing position is that it is unfair to allow the seller such a
broad remedy while limiting the buyer to the restrictions under the
express remedies. The most recent decision in this area follows the
overwhelming opinion of the courts in favor of the buyer having a
private remedy, in addition to and free of restrictions imposed under
the Securities Act.7s In view of the Kardon doctrine and its continued
support no other decision would appear possible. However, the United
States Supreme Court has yet to render its opinion on a lob-5 action,
and the ultimate applicability to such an action of the rule expressio
unius est exclusio alterius remains to be decided upon by the Court.
73 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 27, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 5 78aa (1958).
See text at note 51 supra for similar, but less liberal, venue provisions under the
Securities Act of 1933.
74 Ibid.
75 Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962), recognizing pre-
vious decisions on the same issue in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F. 2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961);
Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F. 2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F. 2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Pa. 1948).
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The plaintiff has the burden, as in Section 12 (2) of the Securities
Act, of showing that the mails or facilities of interstate commerce
were used by the defendant in the employment of the alleged manip-
ulative and deceptive device. However, one advantage not available
under the Securities Act is that the use of any facility of any national
securities exchange may be used to establish jurisdiction in lieu of the
use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce.
The anomaly created by implied remedies is that no express measure
of damages exists. Therefore, the plaintiff who proves a violation of
Rule lOb-5 appears to have a wide choice of relief. He may seek a
rescission of the purchase or sale, or may ask for damages based upon
the out-of-pocket or even the loss-of-bargain rule. In addition, an
accounting for profits may be obtained,78 since the injured party is
entitled to require the defendant to disgorge all gains made at his
expense.
77
The Exchange Act also provides for the liability of controlling
persons, 78 but the defense available to such persons is more tenacious
than that provided by the Securities Act. Under the Exchange
Act, the controlling person is liable to the same extent as the person
he controls unless he acted in good faith and did not directly or in-
directly induce the act or acts constituting the violation. This is ob-
viously easier than proving lack of knowledge or exercise of due care
in belief of the facts constituting the violation.
Other sections of the Exchange Act have given rise to implied
remedies,70 but none have been as complete and far-reaching as the
decisions under Rule 10b-5. The other four securities acts8" contain
more limited civil liability provisions based on false filing, insiders'
76 See the second Kardon decision, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Penn. 1947).
77 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955). In this opinion
Judge Leahy presents an interesting determination of the damages available to the
injured investor.
78 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 20, 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. S 78t (1958).
70 The first implied remedy was based on Section 6(b) of the Exchange Act regard-
ing national securities exchanges, Baird v. Franklin, 141 F. 2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944). In
Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949), a remedy was implied
for violation of the margin requirements of Section 7(c) of the Exchange Act. Cf.
Howard v. Furst, 238 F. 2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), regarding implied liability under Sec-
tion 14(a) dealing with proxies.
80 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. 5 79
(1958); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1958);
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. S 80a-1 (1958); Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1958).
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trading and validity of contracts, but remedies have also been extended
thereunder by the courts, particularly in the Investment Company
Act of 1940. l
Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act82 declares that any contract
made in violation of the Act or Rules thereunder shall be void. How-
ever, its effect is really to make such contracts voidable by stating
that no contract will be void unless an action is brought within one
year after its discovery or within three years after the violation. The
voidability only applies when the plaintiff is in privity with the de-
fendant or a third party beneficiary relationship can be established.
And even though the Act contemplates a civil suit for rescission, the
courts have also allowed damages to the plaintiff.
83
The statute of limitations and privity requirements of Section 29(b)
do not apply to a Rule 10b-5 action inasmuch as the restrictive clause
primarily deals with violations of Section 15(c) and Rule 15cl-2
8 4
thereunder regarding the employment of manipulative, deceptive or
fraudulent devices or contrivances by a broker or dealer. But since an
action under Rule 10b-5 contemplates recovery by any person, there
is nothing to prevent an investor injured by a broker or dealer from
bringing his action under Rule 10b-5. The procedure, however, has
been to allege the violation of all applicable sections in the plaintiff's
complaint even if it may subsequently be reduced to the 10b-5 count
alone.
The extent of the 10b-5 remedy was realized when a unique ques-
tion was raised in Errion v. Connell.85 In that case the issue was
whether one defrauded out of non-securities and securities in the same
transaction can maintain an action under Rule 10b-5. The court held
that the Exchange Act merely created additional remedies for one
defrauded, and the commingling of non-securities with securities in a
single scheme did not oust the district court of its jurisdiction. The
court thus exercised pendent jurisdiction in awarding damages for the
81 For an interesting discussion of the implied liability under the Holding Company
Act and the Investment Company Act, see North, Implied Liability Cases Under the
Federal Securities Laws, CORP. PRAC. COM., Vol. 4, No. 1, at p. 17 et seq. (May, 1962).
8248 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, ch. 677, § 3, 52 Star. 1076 (1938), 15 U.S.C. S 78cc
(b) (1958).
83 Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
8448 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1958); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1949).
85 236 F. 2d 447 (9th Cit. 1956).
INVESTORS' CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL LAWS
entire fraudulent scheme, following the doctrine established in federal
courts for many years. 86
One final point should be brought out in view of the broad remedy
given to the injured investor by a 10b-5 action. If an investor fails in
a common law or state statutory action, can he then seek relief in the
federal courts under Rule 10b-5? In Connelly v. Balkwillsr the court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a 10b-5
action on the grounds that the complaint was based on a cause of
action which was no different than the unsuccessful action brought
in the Ohio courts under state law. The court held that the final
judgment in the state court constituted a bar to the maintenance of
the 10b-5 action since both grew out of the same facts. There appears
to be no escape from the doctrine of collateral estoppel if the basic
issue of fact has been decided against the plaintiff in a prior action.
CONCLUSION
The author has not attempted by any means to present an exhaus-
tive analysis of the statutory remedies available under the federal se-
curities acts, but has merely set forth the basic remedies an injured
investor may choose from, with some of the advantages and problems
the plaintiff and his attorney are confronted with.
In summary, the Securities Act has two important substantive pro-
visions, Section 5 dealing with the registration of securities and Sec-
tion 17(a), being the general anti-fraud provision. Non-compliance
with Section 5 results in civil liability under Section 12 (1), while
faulty compliance means liability under Section 11. The substantive
anti-fraud language of Section 17 creates civil liability under Section
12(2), but is limited in scope. Because of this, many attempts have
been made to create an implied civil remedy under Section 17 itself,
but the very restrictions and differences make it less justifiable to allow
the plaintiff to avoid Section 12 (2) by resorting to 17 (a). 88
Section 11 imposes liability on certain persons connected with the
issuer without any regard to their participation in the offering, while
Section 12 (2) does not go as far in dealing with false and misleading
86 See Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
87 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
88 In Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) the court did uphold
civil liability under Section 17(a), but in that case recovery was also available and
granted under Rule lob-5.
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statements in relation to Section 17 (a), as Section 12 (1) does regard-
ing liability for violation of Section 5.
The concept of fraud under Rule 10b-5 has been broadened be-
yond the definition at common law, while the remedies implied from
the substantive prohibitions of the acts have given investors a more
comprehensive approach to civil recovery than even Congress pro-
vided.
These federal statutory remedies, expressed or implied, are not
without their shortcomings. The litigation, especially under Sections
11 and 12 (2) of the Securities Act, is very expensive. In addition to
the higher federal court costs, expensive expert testimony is often
needed, and many investors are reluctant to throw good money after
bad. The inability to discover certain facts, particularly when there
is no SEC record, the short statute of limitations under the express
remedies and the specified defenses and burdens not found at common
law (though still less restrictive) must also be taken into consideration
by the investor. But whether the investor brings his action under the
Securities Act, dealing with disclosure and fraud in the sale of securi-
ties, or under the Exchange Act, creating a broader liability for the
protection of investors in the purchase and sale of securities, he will
still find that in most cases the law has been strengthened to give him
greater and more definitive civil recovery rights than exist at common
law.
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